**The value is morality. Moral obligations are determined by the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. Derek Parfit writes:**

When we apply the Kantian Formula, we ask which principles each person could rationally choose, if this person supposed that he or she had the power to choose which principles would be accepted by everyone, both now and throughout the future. This formula appeals to the principles that, in these many imagined cases, everyone could rationally choose. We should assume that, in making these choices, everyone would know all of the relevant facts. On that assumption, as premise (B) claims, everyone could rationally choose what they would have sufficient reasons to choose. We are supposing that, as (C) claims, there is some set of principles that are UA-optimific. Of all the principles that everyone might accept, these [the optimific principles] are the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best in the impartial-reason-implying sense. If everyone accepted these principles, things would go in the ways in which everyone would have the strongest impartial reasons to want things to go. That is true by definition. So, as premise (D) claims, these are the principles whose universal acceptance everyone would have the strongest impartial reasons to choose.

Everyone ought to have the same moral beliefs b/c everyone ought to have true moral beliefs. Since rational people ought to believe the truth, they should accept the principles that they could rationally will. Since conflicting beliefs cant both be true, everyone would rationally will the same principles. Those principles are the principles that would make things go best.

Thus standard is rule-consequentialism.

My principle is: It is wrong to use deadly force except in response to an imminent threat of fatal injury.

Kaufman writes: [[1]](#footnote-1)

The imminence rule, as we have seen, is a crucial, independent restriction on the individual right to resort to violence against others, especially deadly violence. The first task of the state is the control of violence, and the restriction of individual violence to cases of genuine emergency when there is no recourse to state protection is crucial to establishing this monopoly on violence. Civil life is, as Pufendorf warned, “too fragile to allow each man to exact what he believes to be his due by violent self-help.”86 Moreover, it is an essential element of the rule of law that each person—even batterers—have a right to due process of law, especially when their lives are at stake. If the rules of self-defense permit an exception to this principle in the case of imminent danger, it is an exception that is best kept to an absolute minimum. As Joshua Dressler cautions, “we should hesitate long and hard before we promote a criminal defence that categorically justifies the taking of life before it is immediately necessary.”87 Before we proceed with any modification (let alone elimination) of the imminence restriction, we had better consider very carefully the implications of such a radical change in the long-established and highly effective principles controlling the private resort to violence.

The imminence rule produces the best consequences because its key to maintaining the rule of law, the state’s monopoly on violence, and unnecessary killings. If everyone accepted the imminence rule, there would be fewer unnecessary killings because people would be less likely to kill suspected dangers without evidence.

Deadly force in response to repeated domestic violence in non-confrontational situations does not meet the imminence rule. Kaufman:

Whitley R.P. Kaufman, [Department of Philosophy at University of Massachusetts Lowell], “Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman”, New Criminal Law Review, Volume 10, 2007. RK

It is the nonconfrontational cases in particular that have received special attention, even though these constitute only a tiny percentage of the cases in which battered women kill their abusers.**11 In such cases**, the woman attacks her abuser while he is not currently threatening her, indeed some- times when he is asleep or unconscious. In a case where a woman kills her sleeping husband, the imminence standard arguably cannot be satisfied as a matter of law: as Richard Rosen suggests, “the threat of death or great bodily harm was not imminent when [she] shot her husband, not, at least, by any reasonable interpretation of the word imminent.”12 But the same problem arises in all nonconfrontational cases, albeit not quite as dramatically. Hence a woman may be precluded from asserting self-defense solely on the grounds of the imminence rule, even if she satisfies all the other requirements of self-defense, including the necessity for the use of force. This apparent paradox—how can force be necessary if the threat is not imminent?—has puzzled many a commentator. But in fact it is no paradox at all: indeed, the very situation is illustrated by the case of Judy Norman.

1. Whitley R.P. Kaufman, [Department of Philosophy at University of Massachusetts Lowell], “Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman”, New Criminal Law Review, Volume 10, 2007. RK [↑](#footnote-ref-1)